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This paper extends the literature on the signalling function of accounting and 
financial information by investigating the information content of the adoption of a 
certain accounting practice, namely the recognition of deferred taxes in the financial 
statements.  Specifically, we examine whether (1) the decision to recognise a certain 
accounting practice, and (2) the timing of the recognition supplement one another as 
signalling devices.  The new accounting law on deferred taxes (Royal Decree of 
December 30, 1991) requires all Belgian firms to recognise deferred taxes for all 
grants on the balance sheet as of 30112/91.  The results show that the recognition and 
the timing of the recognition supplement one another as signalling tools.  The 
immediate recognition of positive deferred taxes signals good news: firms that report 
positive deferred taxes typically perform better at the time of adoption and in the near 
future thereafter. Within the class of recognisers, early recognisers perform better than 
late recognisers. However, this second signal, the timing of the recognition is only 
used as a second signal for the class of tax-paying firms.  Our findings also indicate 
that the impact on the balance sheet is a significant determinant of the decision to 
report deferred taxes.  Firms where the adoption of deferred taxes would lead to a high 
increase in the debt/equity ratio are less likely to adopt, or, if they do report deferred 
taxes, do so later.  These results suggest that firms decide not to recognise positive 
deferred taxes in order to limit the decrease in their solvency position.  Indeed, firms 
that have already experienced a decline in their solvency position are more likely to 
postpone the recognition of deferred taxes. 2 
1. Introduction 
Until 1991, no deferred taxes for grants received were recognised in the 
financial statements of Belgian firms.  This accounting method did not serve the true 
and fair view of the financial statements since grants received were fully recorded as 
equity although they were added to the taxable income over the life of the asset.  To 
eliminate this violation of the true and fair view of the financial statements, the system 
of deferred taxes in the financial statements was introduced in Belgium with the Royal 
Decree of December 30,1991. 
Compared to the International Accounting Standard nr 12, the Belgian 
accounting law of 1991 recognises deferred taxes under fewer circumstances. 
Deferred tax assets can never be recognised in the financial statements.  In the 
financial statements of 1991 deferred tax liabilities can be recognised only for grants 
received. From 1991 onward, they can also occur for surpluses on asset sales.  As a 
better true and fair view of the financial statements is the main purpose of this change 
in the accounting law, it is not surprising that the deferred taxes should not only be 
recognised for new grants received after December 31  1991 but also for all grants 
booked on the balance sheet of 1991.  Hence, the first possible recognition year is the 
same for all firms with grants reported on the balance sheet of 1991. 
Since the introduction of the new accounting law on deferred taxes, firms must 
estimate the amount of taxes that are expected to be paid on the grants in the future. 
This means that at the moment of the receipt, investment grants are no longer fully 
recorded as equity, but should be divided between debt and equity using the expected 
future tax rate. 
When the firms have doubts about the future profitability,  they can decide not 
to book deferred taxes in the financial statements of 1991.  If  in later years the 
prospects become more favourable, the deferred taxes can be recognised at that time. 
The characteristics of the new law therefore introduce an extended adoption timing 
period for the recognition of deferred taxes in the balance sheet.  When firms have 
doubts about their future tax paying ability, they can decide to postpone the 
recognition of deferred taxes at the latest until the asset is totally depreciated. This 
means that the recognition of deferred taxes as well as its timing are decision variables 
for the firm. 3 
The situation with the possible recognition in different years is similar to the 
US  where the F ASB has established a policy of extending the adoption timing period 
for new standards (FAS nr 52; FAS nr 87 ;FAS nr 106).  For example, FAS nr 106 
allows a four year adoption timing period for the introduction of post-retirement 
liabilities other than pensions (Amir & Ziv, 1997b).  In the period 1990-1994, finns 
had the choice to immediately recognise them, to disclose them in the footnotes or to 
not recognise them at all.  The introduction of deferred taxes in Belgium has some 
similarities.  Differently from the introduction of postretirement benefits in the 
balance sheet, finns have more discretion to recognise deferred taxes in the balance 
sheet as they must estimate the future tax paying capacity.  A second difference is the 
length of the adoption timing period.  Firms that have not already recognised deferred 
taxes in their financial statements must evaluate their future profitability position each 
year and decide whether to do recognise at that time. 
The purpose of this study is two-fold.  First, the particular characteristics of the 
new accounting law enables us to examine two areas in the signalling accounting 
literature: the signalling value of a certain accounting practice (Titman & Trueman, 
1986; Hughes & Schwartz, 1988; Hughes et aI., 1994; Bar-Yosef et al.  1995) and the 
information value of the adoption timing (Langer & Lev, 1993; Amir & Ziv, 1997a). 
The main question we investigate is whether the disclosure of positive deferred taxes 
and the timing of this disclosure supplement one another as signalling devices.  The 
disclosure of positive deferred taxes is a reliable signal because the cost caused by the 
decrease in solvency, is larger for firms with negative inside infonnation.  Firms can 
further signal inside information by choosing the moment of recognition: immediately 
or in a later fiscal year. As both the recognition and its timing are decision variables 
for the firm when applying the new accounting rule on deferred taxes, we investigate 
whether they supplement one another as signalling devices. 
The second purpose of this paper is to examine whether the decision to 
recognise positive deferred taxes is determined by its potential impact on the balance 
sheet.  The income smoothing literature investigates how a firm can reach a 
sufficiently high and relatively stable income by choosing particular reporting 
practices.  A question that is studied here, and which gets less attention in the 
literature, is whether a firm is concerned about abrupt changes in its balance sheet 
structure.  The impact on the balance sheet structure can be an incentive either not to value the deferred taxes in the balance sheet, or to postpone the application.  While 
Langer and Lev (1993) laid  the emphasis on earnings management to explain the 
immediate application of FAS nr87, this paper investigates the influence of balance 
sheet smoothing on the immediate recognition or postponement of positive deferred 
taxes. 
4 
Our results indicate that the recognition of deferred taxes and its timing 
supplement one another as signalling tools.  As expected, the recognition of positive 
deferred taxes signals good news: firms that report positive deferred taxes typically 
perform better at the time of the recognition and shortly thereafter.  When the 
signalling function is separately studied for  tax paying and  non-tax paying firms, the 
recognition of deferred taxes can only solve the asymmetry in information for the non-
tax paying firms.  Although the recognition of deferred taxes itself does not seem to 
act as a signalling device for the tax paying firms, the timing of the recognition can 
fulfil this role.  Our results indicate that, of the tax-paying firms that report deferred 
taxes in their balance sheet, those that do so sooner perform better compared to those 
that report deferred taxes later.  These results show that the decision and the timing 
supplement one another as signalling devices.  In the group of well performing firms 
(i.e, tax-paying firms in the current period) most firms recognise positive deferred 
taxes and the timing decision of its recognition can solve the asymmetry in 
information, where very good news results in early recognition.  Non-tax paying firms 
with favourable prospects do not need the second signal, the timing of the recognition, 
as a signalling device.  The recognition of deferred taxes itself is able to solve the 
asymmetry in information about the future performance as the cost of imitation is too 
high for non-tax paying firms with negative inside information. 
Our findings also indicate that the impact on the balance sheet is a significant 
determinant of the decision to report deferred taxes.  Firms where the adoption of 
deferred taxes would lead to a high increase in the debt ratio are less likely to adopt, 
or, if they do report deferred taxes, do so later.  These results suggest that some firms 
decide not to recognise positive deferred taxes in order to limit the negative impact on 
their solvency position.  Indeed, we find that firms that have already experienced a 
decline in their solvency position are more likely to postpone the recognition of 
deferred taxes. 5 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 clarifies the law on deferred 
taxes.  Hypotheses are formulated in section 3 and the empirical results are reported in 
section 4.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The accounting law of deferred taxes 
Before the Royal Decree of 12/30/1991, deferred tax liabilities were not 
recognised under any circumstances in the Belgian accounting law.  With the RD of 
12/30/1991, the Belgian accounting law became to some extent in accordance with the 
International Accounting Standard nr 12 on income taxes. 
lAS nr 12 is based upon the fundamental principle that a firm should recognise 
a deferred tax liability (asset) when a settlement would make future tax payments 
higher (smaller) than they would be if such settlement were to have no tax 
consequences (Par. 10). A deferred tax asset can occur when a firm has loss carry 
forwards or when different methods are used for tax and reporting purposes.  A 
deferred tax liability occurs when a revenue is received or booked but is only added to 
the taxable income in future years (e.g. grants or revaluation of assets).  The RD of 
12/30/1991 did not allow the system of deferred taxes in all these cases.  The 
recognition of deferred tax assets because of loss carry forwards is totally prohibited 
because of prudence and doubts about the realisation.  Furthermore, temporary 
differences because of different accounting methods for tax and reporting methods do 
not occur as the same annual statements are used for both fiscal and reporting 
purposes.  For example, firms that use accelerated depreciation for reporting purposes 
must also use accelerated depreciation for tax purposes.  Finally, the RD 12/31/1991 
does not allow deferred tax liabilities in as many cases as the lAS NR 12 (e.g. the 
revaluation of assets); they are only allowed for grants received and surpluses on asset 
sales. 
When the deferred taxes has be estimated at the time the grants are received or 
the surpluses on the asset sale is realised, the RD also demands to use the liability 
approach of the lAS NR 12 (par. 51). This means that not the current but the future 
expected tax rate is relevant for the valuation of deferred taxes in the balance sheet. 
Hence, deferred taxes must reflect the tax consequences that would follow from the 
manner in which the enterprise expects at the balance sheet date to settle the amount 6 
of its liabilities.  When earnings' forecasts are unfavourable, the firm will not 
recognise deferred taxes in the balance sheet as taxes are not expected to be paid in 
the future. If  at a later date the firm expects better results than before, the true and fair 
view of the financial statements demands that deferred taxes are recognised at that 
time. 
We note that the treatment of deferred taxes in the tax and the accounting law 
differs between investment grants and surpluses on asset sales.  Since grants received 
for investments in fixed assets are credited directly to equity, the corresponding 
deferred taxes are also immediately charged to equity (IAS NR 12, par 61-65).  The 
deferred taxes for surpluses on asset sales are charged to the income statement as a 
transfer to the deferred taxes since the surplus itself is recorded in the income 
statement.  Furthermore, the moment of introduction for the new accounting law 
differs in both situations.  According to the RD of 12/30/1991, the system of deferred 
taxes  must be recognised for all grants that occur on the balance sheet of the year 
1991  (Art 8 §5 RD12/30/1993), while the system of deferred taxes for surpluses 
realised on asset sales must be recognised only for assets sold after 12/30/1991.1  This 
means that deferred taxes on grants received already occur in the financial statements 
of 1991, while they only occur for surpluses on asset sales for the financial statements 
of 1992.  Finally, while the firm can choose between immediate or postponed taxation 
for surpluses on asset sales, immediate taxation can never occur for investment grants. 
When the firm realises a surplus on an asset sale, it is impossible to deduce from the 
financial statements whether the firm (a) deters from using the system of deferred 
taxes, or (b) chooses this system for tax purposes but does not book deferred taxes in 
the financial statements.  However, for grants received no such choice exists in the 
fiscal law: all firms must use the system of deferred taxes for tax reasons while they 
may choose whether or not to book the deferred taxes in the financial statements. The 
different accounting treatment for deferred taxes on surpluses of asset sales and 
investment grants received enables us to identify whether deferred taxes apply to 
grants received or to surpluses on the sale of assets.  We limit our study to the system 
of deferred taxes for grants received because immediate taxation can never occur for 
1 The system of deferred taxes is not obliged for the surpluses realised on the sale of assets before 
12/3111991  because the DIE ratio was expected too decrease to much for most firms. investment grants and because firms have the discretion whether or not to book the 
deferred taxes related to investment grants in the financial statements. 
The recognition of deferred taxes and its timing offers interesting area for 




The recognition of positive deferred taxes requires firms to estimate the 
probability that taxes on the grants received will be paid in the future. As taxes are 
only paid when the firm performs well (e.g., reports positive taxable income), positive 
deferred taxes can fulfil a signalling function.  Contrary to other signals [i.e., the 
choice of inventory method (Hughes & Schwartz, 1988); the percentage of the 
inventory valued by FIFO (Hughes et aI., 1994); the inventory method together with 
the debt level (Bar-Yosef et aI.,  1995) and the auditor (Titman & Trueman, 1988)], the 
choice of a deviating behaviour is not a positive but a negative signal.  Firms choose 
not to report deferred taxes in the balance sheet when they expect not to pay taxes in 
the future.  For those firms, the signalling cost of the recognition is too high: the 
solvency may fall below an acceptable level and debt covenants may be violated, 
requiring renegotiations with creditors now or in the future.  Hence the following 
hypothesis: 
H 1:  Firms that report deferred taxes in the balance sheet tend to outperform 
the non-recognisers in the future. 
Likewise, the timing decision can provide a signal.  The better the inside 
information, the more likely taxes will be paid and the earlier firms will recognise 
positive deferred taxes.  If  a firm recognise earlier, the amount of grants transferred 
from equity to debt is larger, thereby increasing the probability of debt covenant 
violations.  Hence the following hypothesis: 
H2:  Early recognisers tend to outperform the late recognisers in the future. 8 
However, the probability that taxes on grants received will be paid depends not 
only the expected future performance, but also on the current performance and on the 
existence of loss carry forwards.2  If  the firm does not report positive profits in the 
current or past year, loss carry forwards can result in non-positive payable taxes in the 
future, even with improved future performance.  Hence, the presence of loss 
carryforwards and current performance are added as control variables in the analyses. 
Impact on the balance sheet 
The firm's recognition decision may also be determined by the impact on its 
balance sheet structure over time.  Since a part of equity (grants received) is classified 
as debt (deferred taxes), the new accounting law induces an increase in the debt ratio, 
thereby increasing the estimated financial risk and the probability of debt covenant 
violations.  The compliance costs of positive deferred taxes can therefore be: an 
increase in capital costs, debt contract renegotiations, a lower price for new shares or 
debt issued, ...  The assessment of those compliance costs is a difficult task.  Since 
information about the nature and the violation of the debt covenants is not publicly 
available for the sample used in this study, other proxies for the size of these 
compliance costs must be used.  We use the debt ratio and the size of the investment 
grants to estimate the size of these compliance costs,3 which gives the following 
hypothesis: 
H3:  Finns that report deferred taxes in the balance sheet tend to have better 
solvency ratios in 1991 compared to non-recognisers. 
H4:  Finns that report deferred taxes in the balance sheet tend to receive 
smaller investment grants in 1991 compared to non-recognisers. 
The timing decision is also expected to be influenced by the solvency position 
and the size of the grants received.  Firms that recognise earlier are expected to have a 
2 Although the current tax rate can be used as a proxy for the valuation of deferred taxes, the current tax 
rate cannot be introduced in the analysis since the signalling value ofthe deferred taxes is tested for 
both non-tax paying and tax paying firms. 
3 In the recent literature, the proxy is replaced by information about the violation of the debt covenants 
(see e.g., Defond & Iiarnbalvo, 1994).  Information on debt covenant violations is not publicly 
available in an European context, however, since disclosure in the financial statements of this 
information is not required. 9 
stronger pre-recognition balance sheet structure.  Firms that postpone the recognition 
have more time to improve the balance sheet structure, by building up retained 
earnings, for example.  The improved debt ratio at that time makes it possible to show 
positive deferred taxes at a lower cost. The size of the grants received will only 
strengthen this effect.  As the grants received are larger, the probability of debt 
covenant violation increases and encourages firms to postpone the recognition of 
positive deferred taxes.  This results in the following hypotheses: 
H5:  Early recognisers tend to have better solvency ratios in 1991 compared 
to late recognisers. 
H6:  Early recognisers tend to receive smaller investment grants compared to 
late recognisers. 
Firms are concerned not only about the current debt ratio and current 
annual  income, but also about the changes in the income and debt levels over time. 
Managers may attempt to smooth the income level by limiting the variance in the 
reported income over time (Langer & Lev, 1993).  This goal can be reached by 
transferring income between current to future periods.  The recognition of deferred 
taxes in the financial statements cannot be used as a tool to influence the reported 
income since the earnings after taxes are not affected.  However, managers can limit 
the variance in the debt ratio through the recognition (or the lack thereof) of the 
deferred taxes in the balance sheet.  In other words, managers may be concerned about 
smoothing the debt ratio.  For example, firms that increased their debt ratio shortly 
before or during the 1991 fiscal year may decide not to book deferred taxes limit the 
further decline in the solvency position.  However, given a certain change in the 
solvency position compared to the previous period, firms can also try to limit the 
variance orland the increase in the debt ratio in the future. The firm has private 
information about the investment plans, the expected results and the expected changes 
in the financial structure in the future.  If  large investments are planned, the solvency 
position will probably deteriorate and the firm can decide not to book deferred taxes. 
As certain costs ( such as write-offs, depreciation, ...  ) cannot be recognised in the 
financial statements to reach a certain income level, deferred taxes cannot be valued in 
the balance sheet to avoid a too high increase in the debt level. Hence, while pre-1991 10 
increases in the debt ratio are likely to influence both the recognition of deferred taxes 
and the timing thereof, we argue that planned future increases in the debt ratio are not 
expected to influence the timing decision. If  the firm recognises deferred taxes now or 
in the future, the final solvency position will be the same.  This results in the 
following hypotheses: 
H7: Recognisers tend to experience a smaller pre-1991 decline in the solvency 
ration compared to non-recognisers. 
H8: Early recognisers tend to experience a smaller pre-1991 decline in the 
solvency ration compared to late recognisers. 
H9: If  the firm's solvency position is expected to deteriorate in the near  future, 
it does influence the recognition but not the timing decision of  positive 
deferred taxes. 
Evidence in support of these hypotheses, would suggest that firms are 
concerned not only about the current solvency position but also about the changes in 
the solvency position over time. 
Other control variables 
Next to the signalling and the balance sheet smoothing arguments, firm size 
can also be a determinant in the firm's recognition decision.  As large firms are more 
likely to keep abreast of changes in accounting practices and regulations, large firms 
are more likely expected to show deferred taxes in the balance sheet and they do it 
earlier.  However, the size variable does not test whether the financial statements are 
verified by an independent auditor.4  Even if a firm is ignorant about changes in the 
accounting law, the auditor can inform the firm about these changes and can insist on 
applying the new accounting law.s  Hence, the presence of an independent auditor 
may positively influence the recognition decision. 
4  Even  if the  financial  statements  are  verified  by  an  independent  auditor,  the  firm  has  private 
information about the future expected profits and he possesses discretion to give this information to the 
auditor or not. 
5 The financial statements must be verified by an independent auditor when two of th three criteria are 
violated: turnover> 4.958.704 euro, total assets> 2.478.935 euro and number of  employees> 50.  If the 
number of employees>  1  00 then the financial statements must always be verified by an independent 11 
Table 1 summarises the hypotheses and clarifies the explanatory variables with 
the hypothesised signs. 
Table 1: Hypotheses for the recognition and timing decisions related to the 
reporting of deferred taxes in the balance sheet 




Hl,H2: future  f (ROE(I + i) - ROE)  15 
performance 
at.ROEs1  = 
i=91  abs(ROEi)  + 
average change in return on equity for the period 1991-19956 
Hl,H2: future  dp9495=1 when the profits in 1994 and 1995 are both  + 
performance  positive, =0 otherwise7 
Control variable:  profits91 
ROE91 
8 
Current performance  (equity  91  + DT91 ) 
Control variable:  dlcf=1 if loss carry forwards occur on the balance sheet of 
Loss carry forwards  1991; =0 otherwise9 
Balance sheet structure 
H3,H5: solvency in 1991  debt91 - DT91  -
DebtITA91= 
TA91 
H4,H6: size of investment  grants91  + DT91  -
grants in 1991 
grant91 
TA91 
H7,H8: current change in  ddebt9091  -
solvency  (Debt91- DT91)1TA91- (Debt90- DT9o)lTA9o 
= 
(Debt90-DT9o)ITA9o 
auditor even if the other two criteria are not violated.  Whether a firm is publicly held or not does not 
influence whether an auditor is required or not. 
6 We have measured the independent variables as if no [lIm recognises deferred taxes. This means that 
equity = equity + deferred taxes. 
7 The future performance is measured by a dummy variable (dp9495) and by the change in performance 
(at.ROE51). By introducing those two variables, the strenght of the recognition and its timing as 
signalling devices is tested. It can be investigated whether the recognition or its timing informs not only 
the profitability or not but also about the level of profits in the future. 
8 DT= Deferred taxes 
9 A firm can pay taxes on the current year income and still have loss carry forwards.  Not under all 
circumstances can losses be carried forward for tax purposes.  As the financial statements are the same 
for reporting and tax purposes and not all expenses are tax deductible, firms with accounting losses and 







H9: expected future  ~debt9195= 
change in solvency  95  (Debt.  -DT.  )rrA.  -(Debt. -DT,)rrA. 
L  (  1+1  1+1  1+1  1  1  1)/5 
i=91  (Debt.  -DT. )rrA. 
1  I  1 
Other control variables 
firm size  size=Log(total assets) 
auditor  dauditor =1  if  financial statements are audited, =0 otherwise 
Note that when the empirical proxies for the different hypotheses are defined, 
the influence of the chosen reporting policy is eliminated.  This means that the 
financial ratios are determined as if firms do not recognise deferred taxes.  Hence, the 
amount of equity is measured as the sum of equity and the deferred taxes, while debt 
is defined as the difference between total debt and deferred taxes.  The income 
statement variables are not affected since the choice of deferred taxes does not affect 
income after taxes. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Sample selection 
We restrict the sample to Belgian firms that are active in those industries 
where high investments in fixed assets and thus the receipt of investment grants are 
most likely to occur: the chemical, mechanical  and building industry.  From these 
industries, all firms that reported grants on the balance sheet of 1991 were retained 
(the new accounting law on deferred taxes applies only to firms with grants on the 
balance sheet as of 1991).  As the new accounting law is only relevant for annual 
reports published after 30 December 1991, positive deferred taxes could only occur 
from that date onward.  As already mentioned in the previous section, the new 
accounting law applies to all grants booked on the balance sheet of 1991. That means 
that the first possible recognition date is the same for all firms.  Table 2 describes the 
final sample.  Of the total sample of 641  firms, 409 firms report positive deferred 
taxes for the first time in 1991 or 1992.  The firms that recognise deferred taxes in 
1991 are referred to as the early recognisers; the others recognisers are classified as 
late recognisers.  Of the total sample, 213 firms pay no taxes in  1991.  Of the 428 tax 
paying firms, 332 (77.57%) firms disclose deferred taxes for the first time in the 13 
balance sheet in 1991 (254) or 1992 (78).  A minority of non-tax-paying firms (77 or 
36.15%) record deferred taxes for the first time in the balance sheet in 1991 (49) or 
1992 (28).10  Of the 641 firms, 185 firms belong to the chemical industry, 396 to the 
machinery industry and 61  to the building industry.  The average size of the grants 
received is 469609 EURO, which is  1.072 % of the total assets. 
To test the hypotheses concerning the determinants of the recognition 
decision, accounting data over the period 1991-1995 was collected for all sample 
firms. 
Table 2:The introduction of deferred taxes in the balance sheet for the first time 
Recognisers  Non- Total 
recognisers II 
1991  1992 
All firms  303  106  232  641 
Tax paying firms  254  78  96  428 
Non-tax paying  49  28  136  213 
firms 
4.2 Univariate results 
Before presenting the multivariate results, some characteristics of the financial 
variables and some univariate results are shown in Table 3.  The purpose is to identify 
differences between firms with and without positive deferred taxes (Table 3a), and 
10 If  deferred taxes are identified in the balance sheet of 1991, these deferred taxes must apply to grants 
received since the system of deferred taxes for surpluses on asset sales is only introduced from January 
1,  1992  on.  Even  if the firm  uses  the  system of deferred  taxes  for  the first  time  in  1992,  it  is  still 
possible to identify whether the deferred taxes apply to  the grants received or to  the surpluses on  the 
sale of assets or both.  Since the grants received for investments in fixed assets are directly credited to 
equity, the deferred taxes should be charged directly to equity (Par 61-65 IAS nrI2), while the income 
statement is  used to  book the transfer to  deferred taxes  on  the surpluses of the sale of assets.  If the 
transfer to  deferred taxes  in  the  income statement equals zero in  the  first  year the deferred taxes  are 
booked, the deferred tax liabilities only apply to the grants received.  If the sum of the deferred taxes in 
the balance sheet and the withdrawals in the income statement equal the transfer to deferred taxes in the 
income statement, the deferred taxes only apply to the surpluses on asset sales.  If  the deferred taxes in 
the balance sheet are larger than the transfer to deferred taxes in the  income statement, the firm  then 
applies the system of deferred taxes for both grants and surpluses on asset sales. Finally, a situation can 
occur where the deferred taxes in the balance sheet are smaller than the transfer to deferred taxes in the 
income statement.  If  the sum of the deferred taxes in the balance sheet and the withdraws in the income 
statement equals the transfer to deferred taxes, surpluses on the asset sales only occur.  If this condition 
is not fulfilled, the deferred taxes apply to both situations. 
II The initial sample exists of 692 firms. 51  firms are eliminated from the sample of non-recognisers as 
they book deferred taxes for the first time in  1993 (26), 1994 (20) or 1995 (5). This means that the final 
group of non-recognisers exists of firms that did not report positive deferred taxes in 1991-1995. 14 
differences between early and late recognisers (Table 3b).  The non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test is used to test for significant differences. 
Table 3a: A comparison of recognisers vs. non-recognisers: the univariate results 
Variable  mean value for the  mean value for the non- p-value 
recognisers (n=409)  recognisers (n=232) 
aLlli.OE51  (H 1  ,H2)  -0.8719  -1.2910  0.4581 
dp9495 (H1,H2)  0.7017  0.5603  0.0003 
DebtffA91 (H3,H5)  0.5873  0.6482  0.0012 
grant91 (H4,H6)  0.0101  0.0125  0.4332 
.Mebt9091 (H7,H8)  -0.0092  -0.0063  0.5667 
alldebt9195  0.01566  0.02850  0.5926 
Control variables 
ROE91  0.1431  -0.1813  0.0001 
dlcf  0.9340  0.7155  0.0001 
size  13.2506  12.8230  0.0009 
dauditor  0.9584  0.8405  0.0001 
Table 3b: A comparison of early vs.  late recognisers: the univariate results 
Variable  mean value for the  mean value for the late  p-value 
early recognisers  recognisers (n=106) 
(n=303) 
aLlli.OE51  (H 1  ,H2)  -0.8489  -0.9377  0.9966 
dp9495 (Hl,H2)  0.7261  0.6320  0.0691 
DebtffA91 (H3,H5)  0.5861  0.5906  0.9084 
grant91 (H4,H6)  0.0165  0.0085  0.7065 
6..debt9091  (H7 ,H8)  -0.0254  0.0371  0.0137 
alldebt9195  0.0176  0.0101  0.9893 
Control variables 
ROE91  0.1605  0.0934  0.8700 
dlcf  0.9472  0.8962  0.0694 
size  13.3424  12.9882  0.0131 
dauditor  0.9636  0.9434  0.3680 
The univariate results suggest that the future performance influences the 
recognition and its timing.  Recognisers (dp9495, p=O.0003 ) and early recognisers 
(p=0.0691) perform significantly better in the future compared to non- and late 
recognisers.  Although the existence of profits differs between the groups, the average 
change in performance does not differ significantly, neither for the recognition 
(aAROE51, p=0.4581) nor for the timing decision (p=0.9966).  In addition, 15 
recognisers and early recognisers have significantly less loss carry forwards 
(0.9340>0.7155  with p=O.OOOI  for the recognition decision and 0.9472>0.8962 with 
p=0.0694 for the timing decision). 
Next to performance, the balance sheet structure significantly differs 
significantly across the different groups of firms.  In 1991, non-recognisers have 
significantly higher debt ratios than recognisers (p=0.0012).  However, the debt ratio 
cannot discriminate between early and late recognisers (p=0.9084).  The average 
amount of grants received does not significantly differ between recognisers and non-
recognisers (p=0.4332), nor between early and late recognisers (p=0.7065).  While the 
average change in solvency in the current year is not significantly different between 
recognisers and non-recognisers (aAdebt9190, p=0.5667), it is for the timing decision. 
While early recognisers improve their solvency position (-0.0254), late recognisers 
have increased their debt ratio (0.0371) and this  difference is statistically different 
(p=0.0137).  The future change in the debt ratio does not significantly affect the 
recognition (p=0.5926) nor the timing decision (p=0.9893). 
With respect to the remaining control variables we find the following results. 
Return on equity in 1991 is significantly larger for recognisers than for non-
recognisers (p=O.OOOI), but is not significantly different between early and late 
recognisers (p=0.8700).  As expected, recognisers are significantly larger than non-
recognisers (size, p=0.0009).  In addition, early recognisers tend to be larger than late 
recognisers (p=0.0131). Finally, the hypothesis of audited financial statements is also 
confirmed.  Recognisers are significantly more likely to have an auditor (p=O.OOOl), 
while early recognisers are not significantly more likely to have an auditor than late 
recognisers (p=0.3680). 
4.3 Multivariate results 
4.3.1 The general model 
In the multivariate analysis, the joint impact of the independent variables on the 
recognition and timing decisions is tested.  First, the recognition decision will be examined. 
Equation (1) gives the general model, which explains the occurrence of deferred taxes in the 
balance sheet for the entire sample of tax paying and non-tax paying firms.  The dependent 
variable for this logistic regression DR is equal to one if deferred taxes are reported for the 16 
first time in 1991 or 1992 (the recognisers) and equal to zero otherwise (the non-recognisers). 
The general expression for the model is: 
DR = <Xo+ a] ruill.OE51 + a2 dp9495 + a3 DebtJTA91 + <4 grant91 + as Adebt9091 
+!:X{j aAdebt9195 + a7 ROE91 + ag dlcf + {Xg size + aJO dauditor + ~ 
Second, given that firms recognise positive deferred taxes, the timing decision 
is studied.  In this case, the dependent variable in model (1) is replaced by DT, which 
is equal to one if recognition occurred in 1991 and equal to zero if recognition 
occurred in 1992.  The results of these estimations are reported in Table 4. 
Table 4: Multivariate analysis of the recognition and timing decision for the full 
I  sample 
Recognition decision  Timing decision 
(n=641;  )=0.0001)  (n=409;  p=0.0103) 
Coefficient  p-value  coefficient  p-value 
Intercept  -3.745  0.0001  -2.6674  0.0256 
Performance 
aAROE51  -0.00171  0.8805  -0.0093  0.5977 
dp9495  +0.5530  0.0059  +0.5342  0.0468 
Balance sheet 
DebtJTA91  -l.4275  0.0068  +0.3356  0.6210 
grantl  +5.6993  0.3208  +13.5570  0.1323 
Adebt9091  +0.5874  0.2362  -l.5041  0.0240 
aAdebt9195  -1.3014  0.1047  +1.3851  0.4015 
Control variables 
ROE91  +1.0165  0.0015  +0.3785  0.3780 
dlcf  +1.5158  0.0001  +0.7914  0.0980 
size  +0.1589  0.0155  +0.1437  0.0756 
dauditor  +1.5466  0.0001  +0.3459  0.5429 
The recognition decision 
The results of the recognition decision give some support for the signalling 
and the balance sheet smoothing hypotheses.  The coefficient of dp9495 (p=0.0059) is 
positive and significant, as expected.  This finding suggests that firms with positive 
future profits are more likely to report deferred taxes in their balance sheet.  The 
(1) coefficients of the control variables ROE91 (p=O.OOI5) and dlcf (p=O.OOOl) are also 
positive and significant.  Hence, firms with favourable private information about the 
future profitability, good news in the current period and no loss carry forwards are 
more likely to book positive deferred taxes in the balance sheet. 
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However, an improvement in the performance over the period 1991-1995 does 
not significantly encourage firms to book deferred taxes in the balance sheet 
(p=O.8805 for aAROE51).  This finding suggests that the recognition of positive 
deferred taxes is limited: it informs the users of the financial statements whether the 
firm will be profitable in the future (as measured by dp9495), but not about the level 
of future profits (as measured by aAROE51). 
With respect to the balance sheet smoothing hypothesis we find the following. 
The coefficient of DebtIT  A91  is negative and highly significant (p=O.0068), indicating 
that firms with weak solvency positions are less likely to report positive deferred 
taxes.  Thus, firms with high debt levels want to avoid a further increase in their debt 
ratio. However, consistent with the univariate results, the change in the debt structure 
in 1991 is statistically insignificant in explaining positive deferred taxes (p=O.2362 for 
Lldebt9091).  Indeed, as reported in table 3, the mean for both groups is close to zero, 
which is consistent with firms in general maintaining a stable capital structure.  The 
change in the future debt structure over time also seems to explain the recognition 
decision.  The coefficient of aLldebtlTA9195 is negative and marginally significant at 
a 10% level (p=O.1047), suggesting that firms take into account the change in their 
expected future solvency position when making their recognition decision. 
The impact of the grant size is not statistically significant in explaining the 
recognition decision (p=0.3208).  A potential explanation for this result is that there 
are two opposing forces at work.  According to H4, firms with larger investment 
grants are less likely to book deferred taxes because of the large impact on the balance 
sheet structure.  However, as the size of the investment grant increases, the influence 
of the new accounting law on the true and fair view of the financial statements is 
larger.  Adherence to this view should encourage the recognition of deferred taxes. 
Hence, the net impact may be insignificant. 
With respect to the remaining control variables we find that larger firms are 
statistically more likely to book deferred taxes (p=O.OI55), as expected.  Finally, the 18 
presence of an auditor significantly increases the likelihood of recognition (p=O.OOOl). 
This finding demonstrates that an auditor can improve the quality of the financial 
statements. 
The results so far indicate that both firm performance and the potential impact 
on capital structure affect the decision to recognise positive deferred taxes in the 
balance sheet at the moment the accounting law on deferred taxes was introduced in 
Belgium.  Some moderate evidence results are found for the balance sheet smoothing 
hypothesis and for the signalling hypothesis: the variable aLldebt51 is only marginally 
significant and the variable aLlROE5lis not significant. 
The timing decision 
In columns 4 and 5 of  Table 4 we examine whether the timing of the 
recognition decision also provides information.  Of all the recognisers, 303 firms 
introduce positive deferred taxes in 1991 (the early recognisers) and 106 firms 
recognise them for the first time in 1992 (the late recognisers).  The results suggest 
that the timing can also provide information about the future performance.  Two of the 
four variables that test the tax paying ability are statistically significant: the existence 
of profits (dp9495, p=0.0468) and the absence of loss carry forwards (p=0.0980). 
These findings suggest that  early recognisers have performed better in the past and 
continue to do so in the future.  However, the signalling value of the timing decision is 
limited as the variable aLlROE5l is not significant (p=0.5977), which we also found 
for the recognition decision.  As the variable dp9495 is significant for the disclosure 
as well as for the timing decision, evidence is found that the disclosure and the timing 
decision supplement one another as signalling devices.  Unlike for the recognition 
decision, the current performance does not explain the timing decision (p=0.3780 for 
ROE91). 
Different results for the recognition decision and its timing are also found for 
those variables that test the balance sheet smoothing hypotheses.  While the decision 
to recognise is significantly influenced by the debt level and the future change in 
capital structure, the timing decision is significantly affected only by the current 
change in the debt ratio.  Given that firms recognise either in 1992 or 1991, the 
decision is more likely to be postponed to 1992 for firms that have already 
experienced a high increase in debt in the period 1991-1990 (=0.0240).  If  the 19 
solvency position of the firm gets worse, the firm can limit the decrease in the 
solvency position by not transferring a part of the grants received to the deferred taxes 
in 1991 and wait until 1992.  On the contrary, consistent with the hypotheses, the 
long-run change in the future debt ratio does not affect whether recognition occurs in 
1991 or 1992 (p=0.4015) as the decision to recognise cannot affect the solvency 
position in the long run. A last difference between the recognition and the timing 
decision, is the insignificance of the debt level in 1991 for the timing decision 
(p=O.62 10).  Whether the firm applies in 1991 or 1992, the debt level is the same at 
the end of 1992. Therefore, both 1991  and 1992 recognisers will have a relatively low 
debt ratios in  1991, which does not differ a lot between the two types of recognisers. 
As we found for the recognition decision, the size of the grant is not a significant 
determinant of the timing decision (p=O.l323).  Here again, the impact upon the true 
and fair view of the financial statements seems to play an offsetting role.  Finally, as 
hypothesised, larger firms apply the new accounting law earlier (p=O.0756). 
The results of the analyses show that the recognition and its timing both fulfil 
a signalling role.  Firms with positive inside information differentiate themselves from 
the others by recognising positive deferred taxes.  They are prepared to face an 
increase in the debt ratio as favourable prospects limit the chance of debt covenant 
violation.  However, the significance ofthe future performance in the timing decision 
suggests that the recognition of deferred taxes is not always sufficient as a signalling 
device.  If  many firms recognise positive deferred taxes, the recognition can only 
solve the asymmetry in information between firms with very bad and better prospects. 
A second signal, the timing of the recognition, seems to be necessary to solve the 
remaining asymmetry in information between firms with moderate and good 
prospects.  In the next section, we investigate under which circumstances this second 
signal is used. 
4.3.2 The sample of tax paying and non-tax paying firms 
In the previous section the signalling function is studied for the entire sample. 
It is shown that firms with positive inside information recognise positive deferred 
taxes and firms with negative information withhold from booking deferred taxes. 
Within the group of well performing firms, firms with better news further discriminate 20 
by showing the positive deferred taxes earlier.  The question is whether this second 
signal, early recognition, is necessary in all circumstances.  As equity is transferred to 
debt, the solvency position gets worse and debt covenants can possibly be violated. 
For firms that recognise at a larger date, the amount transferred from equity to debt is 
smaller and the probability of debt covenant violation is smaller. 12  As a result,  early 
recognition results in a further increase of the signalling cost.  It is expected that this 
second signal will only be used when the recognition itself is not able to solve the 
asymmetry in information. A possible reason could be a too low difference in the cost 
of showing deferred taxes.  As tax paying firms usually have better solvency positions 
than non-taxpaying firms, this is more likely to occur for the tax paying firms. 
Therefore, we expect that the timing of the introduction is more likely to have a 
supplementary signalling role for the tax paying than for non-tax paying firms. 
To test this hypothesis, the sample is split in two subsamples: firms that do pay 
taxes in 1991 and firms that do not pay taxes in 1991.13  As table 1 shows, 73.45% of 
the tax paying firms recognise positive deferred taxes while only 31.95 of the non-tax 
paying firms recognise positive deferred taxes.  Of the tax-paying recognisers, 76.51 % 
recognise in the first year, compared to 63.63% of the non-tax paying recognisers. 
Table 5a reports the results for the subsamples of tax paying firms while table 5b 
reports the results for the subsample of non-tax paying firms. 
12 As  grants received are booked as a revenue over the life of the asset, the amount of grants received 
in the balance sheet decrease over the life of the asset. If  a firm postpones the recognition of deferred 
taxes, the amount transferred from debt to equity becomes smaller. 
13  The variable Dauditor is not introduced in the subsample of tax paying firms als the financial 
statements of all these firms are verified by an independent auditor. 21 
Table Sa The multivariate results for the recognition and its timing for the 
b  If·  fi  su  sampleo  tax-paylU~ lrms 
Recognition decision for the  Timing decision for the tax 
tax paying firms  paying firms 
(n=428, p=O.OOOl)  (n=332, p=0.0309) 
Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
intercept  3.1136  0.0399  -2.9651  0.1184 
Performance 
llilROE51  +0.0159  0.2909  -0.0034  0.9867 
dp9495  +0.0166  0.9501  +0.6688  0.0248 
Balance sheet 
DebUTA91  -1.4001  0.0577  +0.6436  0.4068 
grant91  +4.5558  0.5662  +13.325  0.2824 
i1debt9091  -0.1814  0.7978  -1.3958  0.0905 
llildebt9195  -3.0096  0.0344  +0.3196  0.8631 
Control variables 
ROE91  +1.6265  0.0310  -0.6195  0.2708 
d1cf  +1.2267  0.0742  -0.2692  0.8199 
size  +0.2963  0.0018  +0.2715  0.0078 
dauditor 
Table Sb The multivariate results for the recognition and its timing for the 
b  If·  fi  su  sample 0  non-tax paylU~ lrms 
Recognition decision non- Timing decision non -tax 
tax paying firms  paying firms 
(n=212, p=0.0003)  (n=77, p=0.0385) 
Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
intercept  -2.5508  0.0572  +1.2389  0.6088 
Performance 
aLffiOE51  -0.0290  0.1181  -0.1100  0.1692 
dp9495  +1.2906  0.0006  +0.6054  0.4556 
Balance sheet 
DebUTA91  -1.4406  0.0904  + 1.0328  0.5912 
grant91  +10.4589  0.1955  +25.322  0.1211 
i1debt9091  +0.8613  0.2144  -2.7054  0.0494 
llildebt9195  -0.1495  0.8608  +3.7689  0.3788 
Control variables 
ROE91  +0.5445  0.0725  +1.2155  0.3497 
dIcf  +0.8036  0.0388  +1.2610  0.0956 
size  +0.0537  0.6176  -0.3046  0.1248 
Dauditor  +1.0043  0.0432  +1.1918  0.1968 22 
The results for the recognition and timing decision for the tax-paying firms are 
similar to those obtained for the entire sample.  A first difference is that for the tax 
paying firms, only the timing decision fulfils a signalling function firms (dp9495, 
p=O.950l for the recognition, p=O.0248 for the timing).  A second difference is that 
the control variable of loss carry forwards has a marginally significant impact on the 
recognition decision (p=O.0742) but not on the timing decision (p=O.8199). 
For the non-tax paying firms, recognition provides a signal (dp9495, 
p=O.0006), whereas the timing does not (p=0.4556). The non-tax paying  firms signal 
their positive inside information by the recognition of deferred taxes in the balance 
sheet.  Because the cost of imitation is high for the firms with unfavourable 
information, they withhold from recognising positive deferred taxes in the balance 
sheet.  As firms with unfavourable prospects do not have an incentive to imitate, firms 
with favourable prospects do not have to use a second signal to reveal their private 
information.  This also explains the insignificant coefficient of dp9495 for the timing 
decision for the non-tax paying firms. These results suggest that differences in the cost 
of recognising deferred taxes explain why the timing of the recognition is not needed 
as a second signal. 
Another difference between the tax paying and non-tax paying firms is that for 
the tax-paying firms, the future change in solvency significantly affects that 
recognition decision (p=O.0344), but the future solvency has no significant impact on 
neither the recognition (p=O.8608) nor the timing (p=O.3788) decisions for the non-tax 
paying firms.  Both non-tax paying firms with favourable and unfavourable prospects 
need a lot of new debt to guarantee the survival of the firm and they are not concerned 
by a high increase in the debt level. They find it more important to reveal their private 
information by recognising positive deferred taxes than to limit the increase in the 
debt level. 
Finally, with respect to the remaining control variables, the results indicate that 
while larger tax paying firms are significantly more likely to recognise (p=O.0018) and 
do so earlier (p=O.0078), size does not have a significant impact on either decision for 
the non-tax paying firms (p=O.6 1  76; p=O.1248).  As for the entire sample, however, 
the presence of an auditor positively influences the recognition for the tax-paying 
firms (p=O.0432). 23 
5. Conclusion 
This paper extends the literature on the signalling function of accounting and 
financial information by investigating the information content of the adoption of a 
certain accounting practice, namely the recognition of deferred taxes in the financial 
statements.  The new accounting law on deferred taxes (Royal Decree of December 
30, 199 I) requires all Belgian firms to recognise deferred taxes for all grants on the 
balance sheet as of 30112/9 I. As the main purpose of this law is a better true and fair 
view, the deferred taxes should be recognised for all grants booked on the balance 
sheet of 1991. 
This particular characteristic offers an interesting sample for research. As the 
moment of introduction does no depend on the timing of the receipt but is the same 
for all firms with grants received before December 301991, two interesting research 
questions can be investigated.  First, it can be studied what determines the recognition 
of deferred taxes in the balance sheet.  Second, the timing of the introduction as an 
information mean can also be investigated. 
In the study of the important factors, the emphasis is placed on the signalling 
and the balance sheet smoothing incentives.  Different from other studies the 
signalling value of the recognition and its timing are investigated together. The results 
indicate that these two choices supplement one another as signalling devices.  Firms 
with favourable inside information are more likely to recognise deferred taxes. 
Moreover, within the class of recognisers, early recognisers perform significantly 
better. 
It is also shown that the timing is not always needed as a second signal. It is 
only necessary when most firms recognise positive deferred taxes in the balance sheet. 
This situation occurs when the difference in the signalling cost is relatively low 
between the different types, that is for tax paying firms, which all have a relatively 
good solvency position.  On the contrary, the recognition of deferred taxes is 
sufficient for non-tax paying firms to reveal their private information.  Non-tax paying 
firms with unfavourable information do not have any incentive to recognise since it 
can result in debt covenant violation and the cost of imitating the firms with 
favourable inside information is too high.  However, for both tax paying and non-tax 24 
paying finns, the recognition and its timing only have limited signalling value.  It can 
only signal in the long run whether a finn is profitable or not but it can not give 
infonnation about the increase in perfonnance. 
The results for the balance sheet smoothing hypothesis are also different for 
the group of tax paying and non-tax paying finns.  As expected, smoothing the debt 
ratio is only the concern of the tax paying finns, non-tax paying finns need a lot of 
new debt to guarantee the survival of the finn.  If  a tax paying finn expects high 
increases in debt, a too high decrease in the solvency position can be avoided by not 
recognising deferred taxes in the balance sheet.  A high increase in the debt ratio 
compared to the previous period is a reason to postpone the recognition. 
Although this paper considers a specific situation, the introduction of deferred 
taxes in Belgium, the ideas can be generalised to other countries.  If  a new accounting 
law with an extended adoption period is introduced, the timing of the introduction as 
well as a particular choice can supply infonnation about the expected success. The 
literature would certainly benefit from exploring the relationship between those two 
signalling devices, the accounting choice and its timing, in different environments. 
Furthennore, the incentives for balance sheet management also need more attention. 
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